Abstract
Final causation, with its theistic implications, is the best rational paradigm with which to understand purpose in the universe. In section 1, I will define and place boundaries around final causation to determine both what it is and what it is not. In section 2, I will examine the primary arguments against final causation including issues with the future affecting the past and issues with the theological implications of final causes. In section 3, I will examine the merits and shortcomings of arguments in support of a non-theistic theory of final causation, and in section 4, I will assert that the theistic version of final causation is the best model that exists for understanding purpose in the universe.
Defining and Expositing Final Cause
The philosophy of final causation was first developed by Aristotle as a reaction to Platonism.[1] Plato argued that there is a fundamental difference between things that have always existed (universals) and things that have come into existence (particulars). Particulars include everything that has come into existence in the known universe and all require a cause or reason for their existence. Plato recognized that particulars are orderly and follow set patterns, and postulated that their cause must be universals. He also argued that the being that contains the universals and actualizes them is God. Thus, the universe and all particulars are expressions of the nature of God with the primary cause being the formal cause that exists in the mind of God.[2] Plato saw the drive toward the perfection of the universal in the particular as the motivating cause for all actualization.[3]
Aristotle took issue with Plato and believed that he attributed too much causation to formal causes. Plato took formal causes to be both the essence and cause of things, but Aristotle recognized that “formal essences neither cause change or movement … nor indicate the end or final cause of anything.”[4] Rather than universal forms bringing about final causation, Aristotle taught that particulars are instances of the same universal because they have the same final cause.[5] As such, final cause is the true origin point for movement of all matter toward its ideal potential.[6] Thus, for Aristotle, “the final cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake of something else, but for whose sake everything else is.”[7]
The concept of an end to which other things exist can look different depending on the level of sentience of the object that is subject to a final cause. For example, the inanimate object, whether natural or artificial, has no ability to generate final causality within itself, and thus is only acted upon externally by final causality as received from sentient beings. Beings with any degree of sentience possess the ability to be acted upon by other final causes, to provide final causes for others, and to be a final cause in and to themselves.[8] The source of final causation is one of the points that is heavily critiqued by materialists and physicalists who believe that if final causation exists it must originate in inanimate matter.
To justify the existence of final cause, it is important to define the types of experiences and questions that it alone can answer. Final cause does not answer the question of “What environmental or situational inputs contributed to bringing about an event?” (efficient cause), nor “What end will a given choice bring about?” (formal cause).[9] Rather, final causes answer the questions of “What does it mean that an event happens?” or “To what end did an event happen?”[10] The following are implications of the answers to these questions: (1). All actions and events are moving toward a designated end that Aristotle defines as “good;”[11] (2) the universe and all that is in it has meaning that is defined by something other than itself; (3) the sensation of purpose is a real thing as opposed to an artificial construct. Thus, final cause is an essential part of the universe as none of the other types of causality can answer these questions.
Arguments Against Final Cause
The most forceful argument against the existence of final cause is the incomprehensibility of how a future goal or end could be a cause of a present event or situation.[12] Final causes are often described as causes that are “lurking in the future,” but have causal power in the present.[13] Unfortunately, due to the materialistic bent of many philosophers and scientists, final causation has been denied because the only type of causation that is accepted is causation that exists temporally prior to the effect.[14] In other words, the only type of causation that is truly valid under this paradigm is efficient causation, which is solely governed by the “principles of motion and rest,” as opposed to will, thought, or decision.[15]
Strictly speaking, it is difficult, if not impossible, to directly prove that something like a final cause exists in the future; however, a case can indirectly be made for the existence of final cause by assuming its absence and determining how the world would be different.[16] Consider, as Aristotle did, the water cycle on Earth. The sun heats the earth, which causes the evaporation of water; rising water cools and condenses into clouds; cloud water accumulates until it is too heavy and falls to the earth. It is absolutely true that there are natural efficient causes that govern the entire process. But the question is why is the cycle there in the first place? Pure chance could account for it, but then one would have to be willing to attribute the entirety of civilization and all life on Earth to a providential chance. In fact, the entire universe from the beginning to the present day becomes one large, astronomically-impossible chance. The whole universe is made up of regular, recurring events that make life possible and like Aristotle, it is easy to see how “when an event takes place always or for the most part, it is not incidental or by chance.”[17]
The second objection many raise against final causation is born out of the “fear that the ultimate interpretation of final causality will be theological.”[18] In other words, final causation seems to directly necessitate the existence of God. Philosophers’ and scientists’ issues arise from the difficulty with the language that final cause requires. Eminent biologist Ernst Mayr argues that “teleological statements and explanations [of final causation] imply the endorsement of unverifiable theological or metaphysical doctrines in science.”[19] The charge against final cause is not that it is wrong in any logical or rational sense, rather, that materialism and strict physicalism a priori hold that God, spirit, and soul do not exist, which seems completely incompatible with final causation’s requirement for a mind to operate.
This objection holds very little water as it makes the same mistake that it charges, namely, it shoehorns metaphysical doctrines into science. The following are all metaphysical doctrines that materialists have fit into science: (1) efficient causation is the only true causation; (2) thus the universe must be an infinite chain of materialistic cause and effect relationships; and (3) there is no such thing as purpose in the universe since the hard determinism of efficient causation precludes it. The exclusion of final cause due to its theistic implications is no different than the inclusion of an eternal universe due to the desire to be able to fully understand the universe through material causation alone. The second charge of Mayr, that there is no verifiable evidence for God, is also erroneous. Due to his materialism, the only type of evidence for God that Mayr would accept is materialistic causation. However, by definition God is an unmoved Mover, and therefore lies outside the realm of causality. Thus science would never directly prove God.[20] Additionally, Mayr ignores the bountiful evidence that comes from the intelligent design movement, the historical record, and philosophical inquiry that all support the existence of God.[21]
Arguments in Support of Non-Theistic Final Cause
Peirce approaches final causality from the perspective of pragmatism. His argument is founded on the premise that final causes are emergent as opposed to eternal.[22] Peirce does not need to rely on God as an explanation for purpose of the universe as he believes that the primary example of “causation is that the laws of physics came about out of chaos – thus out of chaos comes order.”[23] In Peirce’s world, there is an infinite amount of time for the laws of physics and the final causality that they engender to arise out of nothing. In this way, the need for a definite end or primary cause is dispensed with.[24]
Peirce also argues around the temporal issue of final causality by redefining future ends in terms of present actualities. For example, an embryo can have its driving force to maturation be the final cause of survivorship since there are mature beings around it who are in the mature state. Thus, the organism itself does not have to be mature for the final cause of survivorship to be active.[25] No final causes are actual — in Peirce’s world they are all general, thus there is no need to reach into the future for the specific end if the end already exists somewhere in the present.
Peirce commits two serious errors in his thinking with relation to final causes. The first concerns the origin of the laws of physics. Peirce states that chance brought about the laws of physics and because they are irreversible they bring about order.[26] However, for chance to bring about an effect, it has to operate on something. Peirce is unable to supply what that something is. “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is the central question that plagues Pierce’s philosophy. In the end, he refuses to address the ultimate question of final causation. Additionally, he only side steps the question of why things are the way they are with his analysis of the laws of physics. He argues that they are the way they are because of the end result of having the specific laws of physics that exist in our universe. However, that does not imbue the universe with meaning. In his view, meaning is simply the end in and of itself. He leaves the question of “to what end?” completely unanswered.
Second, Peirce’s reframing of final causes in terms of present actualities is flawed due to its lack of explanatory scope. While the presence of a mature organism could theoretically act as the final cause for a young organism to pursue maturity by appealing to the young organism’s sense of future possibility, it fails completely when applied to inanimate objects or the universe itself. Inanimate objects do not have a sense of community and thus final causes cannot operate in them in the same way as they do in sentient beings. Additionally, at the moment of the universe’s origin, there were no other mature universes around from which the current universe could theoretically gain an understanding of its final form.
Another prominent non-theistic theory of causation comes from Dr. Steven Smith. In his view, final causation is not permanent and is defined as “the pull on a being of its own proper nature so far as that nature has yet to be achieved”[27] Objects only have final causation until they have fully achieved their true form. At that moment, the object becomes a means for something else to realize its final form. Additionally, Smith circumvents the temporality issue of final cause by reversing the method of causation: from an object drawn toward a final form because of the end’s meaning, to present conditions allowing an object to proceed toward a final form. In Smith’s view, the end directedness is meaningless in itself, but only given meaning because it was selected for by nature.[28]
In this way, Smith deftly maneuvers around the primary issues of final causality. However, he introduces a whole set of new ones. First, he has lost significant clarity of thought in his attempt to make final causation emergent from nature. His Red Sea statement is the perfect example of this:
“”What was the final cause of the Red Sea incident?” a question which most naturally relates to the intentions of a divine agent. It is, instead, “How does the Red Sea incident, taken together with our present chance to realize a just social order that it gave us, constitute a meaning in relation to which our own action is allowed to have a point, and thus a correlated, finalistically caused meaning of its own?””[29]
By introducing emergent causation, he has avoided theological implications, but the cost is any hope of common man understanding his circumstances. Rather than having an overarching final cause to hold on to when making decisions and when life seems to be contradictory, Smith’s view requires that people are able to fully comprehend their situation with a virtually world/universe-level interconnectedness to be able to generate their own meaning and direction.
Second, though Smith has avoided the issue of needing a primary uncaused cause, he has bound himself to a form of extreme relativism that ultimately robs people of any true meaning or purpose. Smith assumes a universal, external frame of reference that can pass judgment over situations and events as they relate to final cause and meaning. However, the beings that hold this external frame are none other than the human beings within the event itself. To assume that they would all come to the same conclusion in every situation is directly against human experience, so he must adopt a “it’s true for me” mentality wherein each individual creates meaning for him or herself. Unfortunately, this leads to the reality that no individual’s final cause is truly the “final” cause and so meaning and final causation devolves into a human construct that is useful only so far has it helps the individual.
An Argument for Theistic Final Causation
Dr. Porter frames the question of final causation succinctly, asking, “Given that mankind has consciousness and is the only being capable of accomplishing the destiny of mankind, is there demonstrable evidence of the existence of a final cause and is the power omnipotent and intellectual power.”[30] The question is not, as other scholars have tried to make it out to be, how can final cause be understood apart from God, but whether or not final cause, with all its theistic implications, exists at all. To answer the question, Porter recommends an analysis of the end that the universe seems directed toward. He observes that the end “points toward perfect morality” and speaks of a time when “faith shall be that only which is perfectly consistent with the highest human reason.”[31] In essence, Porter’s observation can best be described as “your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven.”[32] There is an ideal place, heaven, that is real and exhibits a perfect form of morality and life. It is this reality which is exists in the hearts of people and drives them toward it. The end also speaks of intelligence and power as “there is … in all things, design,” and with “design presupposing intelligence, there is intelligence.”[33] Thus, by examination of the end, there is sufficient evidence to say that final causation exists and that it is empowered by a creator who has an ultimate design for all things.
Porter’s understanding of final causation also deals with the issue of temporality, since ultimate final cause would act from eternity. One argument against final cause is that it must act from the future on the past, which is against common sense. However, if God is the source of it, final causation then acts out of timelessness and eternity. Thus, the traditional order of cause and effect is not violated. This thinking could continue into time as well, because even though secondary final causes seem to be future directed they would ultimately find their source in God and His comprehension of the form of all things. Additionally, the concept of God grounds formal and final cause in reality. Final cause is God’s action to bring about the formal cause of a “divine blueprint” that exists eternally within the mind of God.[34]
Conclusion
Despite its opponents’ arguments, final causation is actually the best explanation for the existence of the universe. Final causation comes complete with a theology that accounts for how final causation interacts with the universe and provides an explanation for how final causation can affect events from an eternal or “future” perspective. Additionally, final causation accounts for how thinking, rational subjects produce end-directed effects: rational beings utilize final causation as their primary mode of action. Without final causation, the universe has no meaning, no explanation, and no future hope. With it, the universe becomes an understandable yet undeniable miracle.
[1] T. M. Forsyth, “Aristotle’s Concept of God as Final Cause,” Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 82 (July 1947): 112.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., 114.
[4] Ibid., 118.
[5] Stephen B. Hawkins, “Desire and Natural Classification: Aristotle and Peirce on Final Cause,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 2007): 528.
[6] T. M. Forsyth, “Aristotle’s Concept of God as Final Cause,” Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 82 (July 1947): 120.
[7] Aristotle, Metaphysics Book 2 Part 2, accessed December 15 2016, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.2.ii.html.
[8] Stephen B. Hawkins, “Desire and Natural Classification: Aristotle and Peirce on Final Cause,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 2007): 523.
[9] Stephen G. Smith, “The Causality of Finality,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4 (October 1985): 311.
[10] Ibid., 312.
[11] Aristotle, Metaphysics Book 2 Part 2, accessed December 15 2016, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.2.ii.html.
[12] Henry Wang, “Rethinking the Validity and Significance of Final Causation: From Aristotelian to Peircean Teleology,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 41, No.3 (Summer 2005): 618.
[13] Stephen G. Smith, “The Causality of Finality,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4 (October 1985): 316.
[14] Stephen B. Hawkins, “Desire and Natural Classification: Aristotle and Peirce on Final Cause,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 2007): 522.
[15] Boris Hennig, “The Four Causes,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 106, No. 3 (March 2009): 149.
[16] Aristotle, Physics, book 2 part 8, accessed on December 15, 2016, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Stephen B. Hawkins, “Desire and Natural Classification: Aristotle and Peirce on Final Cause,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 2007): 522.
[19] F. J. Ayala, “Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 37, (1970), p. 11.
[20] Gregory Vlastos, “A Note on the Unmoved Mover,” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 52. (July 1963): 246-247.
[21] Frank Turek and Norman Geisler, I Don’t Have Enough Faith To Be an Atheist, (Wheaton Il: Crossway Books, 2004).
[22] Ben Zhang and Bill Guschwan, “Aristotle’s Fourfold Causality, Tetralemma, and Emergence,” ETC (January 2014): 65.
[23] Henry Wang, “Rethinking the Validity and Significance of Final Causation: From Aristotelian to Peircean Teleology,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 41, No.3 (Summer 2005): 617.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., 605. and T. L. Short, “Peirce’s Concept of Final Causation,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Fall 1981): 369-370.
[26] Henry Wang, “Rethinking the Validity and Significance of Final Causation: From Aristotelian to Peircean Teleology,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 41, No.3 (Summer 2005): 617.
[27] Stephen G. Smith, “The Causality of Finality,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4 (October 1985): 316.
[28] Ibid., 319.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Morris M. Cohn, “Dr. Porter on Final cause, An Intelligent Power,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 3 (July 1877): 324.
[31] Ibid., 326.
[32] Matthew 6:10 (NIV).
[33] Morris M. Cohn, “Dr. Porter on Final cause, An Intelligent Power,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 3 (July 1877): 329.
[34] Mihretu Guta, “The Divine Blueprint” Lecture at Biola, La Mirada, CA, Summer 2016.
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