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Chris Berg

Critique of Models of Revelation by Avery Dulles

Critical Analysis

Dulles opens his book by outlining his methodology and assessment criteria. He asserts that the study of revelation must take place before the assumption of any specific doctrinal theology can be affirmed. He holds that reason cannot lead one to revelation; rather, the existence of revelation must be held presuppositionally. He also takes the body of the universal church’s faith tradition as valid and binding over any theory of revelation. His criteria for analysis are primarily subjective and rely on one’s interpretation of the bible, mental reasoning skills, perceived benefit, and applicability in an ecumenical framework. As per his methodology, Dulles does not attempt determine if a model is correct, instead he sets himself to the task of determining which model best explains the data or is the most accurate in its description.

First, Dulles assesses propositional revelation from both the Evangelical and Catholic standpoints. In this model, revelation is content that is delivered through speech to people who were commissioned by God to be its recipients. Thus, revelation is knowledge of God in verbal propositional form. Revelation has a definite meaning communicated by both God and the human author. The process of writing down revelation is call inspiration and does not demand a dictation model but does imply infallibility and inerrancy of the original text. The final people to receive a commission to record revelation were the apostles, thus no form of revelation occurs today. The Holy Spirit’s speech and illumination are bound to the revelation recorded in Scripture. The Evangelical and Catholic models differ concerning the role of tradition. The Evangelical model holds that Scripture is the final revelation, whereas the Catholic model holds to the continuation of the apostolic authority and commission in the church. Thus, the Catholic model holds all dogma and interpretation of Scripture that is certified by the church as revelation.

Dulles holds a positive view of the propositional model, citing its emphasis on the authority of Scripture, internal coherence, and missional utility as positive elements. However, the subjectivity of his criteria shows during his critique. He argues that the Bible never makes a claim to propositional infallibility, which is a matter of interpretation. Second, he disparages the authoritarian nature of the model, saying that the model is not compatible with other branches of Christianity nor other religions. Third, he takes issue with the theory of language that undergirds the model; he states that it does not take genre and literary forms into account and that in order to understand the meaning of words, one must also know the person who uttered them. Thus, according to Dulles, the model is deficient with regard to meaning.

Next, Dulles analyzes the revelation as history model. Under this model, revelation is not propositional, nor is it words; instead, it is historical events. God discloses knowledge about Himself through historical events and through His interactions with Israel and the church. Some who hold this model argue that the common thread holding all of God’s self-revealing acts together is the theme of salvation. Others hold that God acts with humanity in general and thus universal history is also revelation. The Holy Spirit’s role in this model is to control the unveiling of the divine event as well as ensuring that the minds of those who experience it are able to understand and comprehend it rightly. In this way, the model does not break completely away from words and written documents. Instead of serving as revelation themselves, they serve as witnesses to the revelation events. Additionally, revelation events are not context-less. Rather, they are accompanied by “prophecy and apocalyptic expectation” which provides the proper framework for interpretation.

Dulles affirms that this model is more relational than the propositional model, and also avoids an authoritarian stance while better accounting for Biblical language. However, he heavily criticizes this model on a number of points that underline its inability to serve as a proper model. First, he points out that the Bible is automatically downgraded as it is not itself an event. The model also fails to account for Biblical literature that is propositional in nature and reveals knowledge about God. Additionally, he cites that the model is open to historical relativism and some of this model’s proponents hold that the Bible is legendary in nature. Finally, he argues that interpretation of events is still required and for interpretation to be proper it must be on some level authoritative. Thus, this model’s enforced submission of the word under the event is incoherent.

Third, Dulles addresses revelation as inner experience. Under this model, revelation is neither content-rich nor an event. Instead it is an internal experience of those who believe whereby God speaks directly from divine Spirit to human spirit. As a defense for this point, this model asserts that because God is Spirit, He can only communicate in the single way which is internal to Himself: communication by spirit. In practical terms, this communication is experienced as the spiritual sense of God’s presence in individual people. The result of this communication is religious emotion, piety, and religious speech that attempts to characterize the experience. Under this view, the Bible does not have authority, only God Himself has authority as the ultimate person. This model holds Scripture to be fallible words and deeds that in a mystical way impart eternal truth. As such, certainty is not to be found in Scripture, doctrine, preaching, or any externally communicated form of language; rather, certainty is found in one’s personal, internal “communion with the life of God” (76).

Dulles’ merits of this model revolved around its ability to address the questions and concerns of skeptics. The model circumvents Kant’s critiques of reason and experience to the extent that those who hold to it do not have to justify their individual beliefs. Additionally, Dulles affirms that this view promotes devotion to God and His morality while allowing for dialogue between and revelation within all world religions. However, his critiques again demonstrate his belief that this model is not valid for use due to its contradictions with the Bible, rejection of prophetic witness, and disagreement with the bulk of church tradition on revelation. He also points out how this model nullifies the differences between religious experiences of different religions and that such blending is harmful. Also, while the model does promote spiritual experience, it does little to alleviate the rational questions that people may have about God, creation, and eschatology. Finally, he ends by asserting Schillebeeckx’ observation that even internal experience requires interpretation to be counted as revelation, thus the system is not entirely internally coherent.

Next, Dulles critiques Barth’s model of revelation as dialectical presence. This model is predicated on a Christocentric view of revelation wherein Jesus Christ as the Word of God is the full and final revelation of God. The content of this revelation is located in Jesus Himself and His actions, deeds, works, and words. Revelation then occurs as an event when one comes in contact with Jesus Christ. There are three means by which one can become contemporaneous with Jesus: proclamation, Scripture, and contact with Jesus Himself. As the final method only occurred during His earthly presence, modern day people come into contact with revelation through the other two. Dulles argues that Barth holds revelation and Scripture as separate non-overlapping entities. Scripture is solely the witness to revelation; it is not revelation itself. It only becomes the word of God in a paradoxical sense. Revelation also includes the life-transforming subjective experience whereby the Holy Spirit changes the individual who comes in contact with revelation.

Dulles argues that Barth was able to adequately address the issues of liberal theology. His model of revelation is biblical, circumvented the attacks on the historicity of Scripture, and provided an explanation for how one could encounter a transcendent God. However, Dulles is also quick to point out that Barth’s theology is internally incoherent and ignores multiple teachings of Scripture and tradition. Additionally, by avoiding history, Dulles asks how the Christ of faith relates to the Jesus of history. He argues that although Barth has uncovered an existential connection between God and man, he has forfeited a real physical encounter between God and man. Finally, as with the propositional model, he accuses Barth of being “unfavorable to interreligious dialogue” (96). Overall, Dulles accepts that this model could be utilized in the church, but with some reservations.

The fifth model that Dulles assesses is revelation as new awareness. This model requires that one hold a different view of anthropology than Christianity has traditionally affirmed. Under this view, mankind is born with a deficient level of consciousness. This is overcome via revelation, which is where the human spirit transcends its own limitations and experiences a fuller life. Under this model, revelation does not reveal God nor does it have Him in mind. Instead, the focus is on people experiencing a form of “divine life” (98). Along these lines, revelation takes on a timeless and eschatological role. It becomes the vehicle by which humanity proceeds toward the second coming of Christ and perfection in the afterlife. Veracity and historicity are not important. Biblical stories are useful in that they provide creative narratives that capture powerful symbols that are capable of bringing about this heightened consciousness.

Dulles’ main support for this model comes from its support of universalism and interreligious conversation. By rejecting historicity, Dulles also affirms this model’s ability to avoid the skeptical critiques from scientific and historical fields. He also lauds this model’s rejection of authoritarianism and its ability to incorporate a wide variety of human experience under its umbrella. Dulles also points out that this model appeals to the mind of the modern man who desires autonomy, freedom, and social and personal progress above all else. He also supports this model’s view on Scripture that meaning is not to be found in the author or the text itself; rather, it is to be found in the reader. Dulles has two criticisms of this model. First, he argues that it does not fit in line with Scripture and tradition. Second, he states that its ongoing view of revelation means that people must always continue to seek new revelation as historical revelation is insufficient. Overall, Dulles is more supportive of this model than other models but still holds substantial reservations concerning its use in the church.

Critical Evaluation

Dulles makes two assertions in his methodology that color every aspect of his assessment. First, that he will not claim a model is wrong, and second that his criteria are highly subjective in nature and are bolstered by his own brand of ecumenicism. For example, his critique of propositional revelation was not a pure critique, but a critique in line with his own desire for interfaith dialogue. Any propositional revelation theologian would probably have put most of Dulles’ critiques in the category of merit excepting his comments about language theory and meaning. The same occurs in reverse for other models. Dulles’ praise for new awareness centers on its ability to syncretize with virtually any other world religion and thus promote ecumenicism.

With regard to his refusal to designate whether a model is correct or not, he seems inconsistent best or in denial at worst. One of his criteria is how well a given model fits in line with the Bible and tradition. He argues that the fifth model disregards both Scripture and tradition and that some of the other models only hold to traditional Christianity to varying degrees. Yet, this is not enough to merit the rejection of a model. His stance on how to use the Bible and church tradition seems to rob them of their authority.

These issues play out fully in chapter eight where Dulles does a quick comparison of all the models. He focuses this section on trying to demonstrate how all of the models contain the same core understanding of revelation. However, in doing so, he commits several grievous equivocations. First, he states that revealed truth is common to all of the models of revelation. However, each model differs on the ontological status of truth. Some view truth as propositionally veridical content, others view truth as non-propositional emotive spiritual feelings, and still others view truth as any spiritual experience that brings one toward greater consciousness. Similarly, he argues that all models hold that revelation “comes in a finally decisive way in Jesus” (117). Nothing could be further from the truth. In the fifth model, Dulles offers the critique that Jesus’ presence on earth and the record of it were not sufficient. Instead, people require further ongoing revelation. He also argues that all models hold that revelation is primarily encountered through Scripture, but models three and five emphatically denounce that axiom.

In the end, downplaying the differences and overselling the commonalities is exactly what Dulles needs to do in order to set the stage for the rest of the book. He asserts that he does not want to create a sixth model of revelation; rather, he intends to create a unifying “tool” that helps each of the models draw on their strengths and overcome their weaknesses (128). Whether or not he will be able to accomplish this task remains to be seen in the second half of the book; however, there are substantial reasons to assume he is setting out on a hopeless task. First, he is trying to use a tool to solve methodological and presuppositional problems. No amount of interpretation or hermeneutical maneuvering is capable of overcoming the flawed assumptions that go into building his model. Second, he is assuming dichotomies like subjective and objective can be truly harmonized. He remarks that others like Bernard Lonergan have tried to accomplish this same task; however, it is probable that he will merely create the illusion of maintaining one side of the dichotomy while truly asserting the other side. Three, if his tool does succeed in becoming the meta-framework that unites all of the other modes of revelation, it is difficult to see how it will not itself become the new and best model for revelation.

Despite these issues, Dulles does provide a concise and informative overview of the main models of revelation. He isolates the most salient points from each field and simultaneously gives voice to the diversity between the individual scholars that comprise the field. Though Dulles does present the information with a heavy bias, his book succeeds at the task he set out to accomplish: to compare and critique the models of revelation. Unfortunately, his critique may be too entrenched in his own worldview for it to be broadly useful.

Critical Analysis

Dulles spends the second half of his book attempting to utilize his theory of symbolic mediation of revelation to unify and correct the five main models of revelation. In order to accomplish his task, Dulles redefines symbol to remove it from its relativistic setting. First, he grounds symbols in the cosmic universal archetypes that are part of nature itself. In this way, Dulles hopes to avoid the reader-response mode of interpretation that traditionally accompanies symbols. He argues that meaning flows forth from archetypes into the symbols. This imbues symbols with a plenitude of meanings. Those who encounter or meditate on the symbol then access portions of these meanings through their contextual community. The community, often identified as the church and a community bound by Scripture and tradition, forms the interpretive boundaries on the plethora of meanings inherent within the symbols. Thus, for Dulles, revelation is neither propositional knowledge, nor internal experience; rather, it “gives participatory awareness” of the life and way of Jesus and God (138).

Dulles takes this understanding of revelation and applies it to Jesus Christ as the ultimate revelation of God. Thoughtfully, Dulles recognizes that calling Christ a symbol is antithetical to classical Christology due to the dehistoricizing effect of traditional symbol usage. However, Dulles makes two theological assertions that keep him from falling into Tillich’s mode of thinking. First, he affirms that symbols can both simultaneously be a symbol as well as divine revelation. Second, he states that symbols do not have to be referential; they can directly speak of themselves. Thus, Christ is a symbol of God, the very revelation from God, and historically, Jesus, the God-man. By redefining Christ as a symbol, Dulles believes that Christology can better account for the transformative power of Jesus and His interaction in the lives of believers.

Reorienting Christ and revelation around the idea of symbol has consequences for the possibility of revelation in other religions, thus Dulles attempts to utilize symbols to create interfaith dialogue without being syncretistic. To accomplish this task, he sets Jesus up as the ultimate symbol that governs all other valid symbols, even ones that can be found in other religions. He argues that other religions do not contain symbols that add to the symbol of Jesus, but may contain symbols that tap into the same archetypal patterns that make up the symbol of Jesus. In that way truth may be found in other religions, but only as understood through the ultimate symbol of Jesus Himself. In terms of the other models of revelation, Dulles’ views are more in line with the more subjective models three and five over and against the more rigid models.

To reinforce external and improper interpretation of revelatory symbols from other religions and communities, Dulles sets the Bible up as one of the primary interpreters of Christian symbols. He sees the Bible as a written record and documentation of divinely revealed symbols. Thus, the Bible is authoritative in its speech about Christian symbols, but it is not, nor does it need to be fully divinely inspired and inerrant. It is only necessary that God’s self-disclosure though symbols be correct. Over all other religious works, the Bible alone can be used as the guide to interpret Christian symbols. However, Dulles does not hold the Bible as authoritative over the church. He maintains that Christian symbols hold the ultimate authority over the church and that the type of community those symbols produced led to the church’s decision in determining which books of the apostles would be authorized as canon. Under his view, the church has authority over the canon and the Bible only has authority because the church grants it. Thus, Dulles remains true to his theory by hold the symbol of Christ supreme and subordinating all else to it.

Dulles goes on to elaborate the role of the church in revelation by declaring that the church itself is a symbol whose entire purpose is centered in being a subjective revelation of the “Christ-event” (220). One of the implications of this theology is that the church becomes sacramental. By participating in church, people have access to divine revelation as given through Christ. The earthly purpose of the church is to use the revelation given to it to transform the individual members into a people of God that reflects the Kingdom of God. A second implication is that there is no true engagement with revelation outside of the church. Though symbols that contain revelation may be present, their proper interpretation only exists within the church community.

Dulles ends his investigation into the nature of revelation as symbol by discussing how one comes into agreement or “assent” with revelation (246). He outlines the problem as one between the position and authority of reason and faith. By holding to his model of revelation as symbolic communication, he argues that by its very nature, revelation is not assented to through reason. Rather, revelation utilizes intuitions, clues, and the very grace of God to produce assent in a person. Because of its non-propositional nature, demonstration of veracity is not needed. Additionally, Dulles acknowledges the role of coherence in assent. He argues that revelation should agree with the “totality of experience” and is corroborated by multiple people and communities (259).

Finally, Dulles entertains the idea that his view fundamentally changes the purposes of revelation. First, he argues that due to the symbolic nature of revelation, faith no longer proceeds from revelation; rather, faith and revelation proceed and interact with each other. Second, he shifts authority away from revelation as such and onto the church. For Dulles, the church is engaged in a continual play of self-expression whereby it understands the key Christian symbols. Third, revelation takes center stage in the theological enterprise rather than the laying down of doctrines as a result of scriptural exegesis. In this way, theology is seen as the tool by which revelation is discovered as the Christian symbols themselves are exegeted.

Critical Evaluation

Though Dulles set out to craft a paradigm for revelation that unified the five models of revelation, fixed their weaknesses, and enhanced their strengths, it is difficult to affirm that he accomplishes his task. First, his method involves him placing his theory of revelation behind all of the other theories as though his view was the ground for the rest. By doing so, he relegates the affirmations of the other models to secondary assertions rather than the axiomatic claims that they actually are. In doing so he is not able to achieve unity between the models; he only degrades their integrity. This is most evident in his section where he directly compares symbolic mediation of revelation with all of the other models. For instance, he argues that the propositional model has merit but only with regard to explicating various meanings of Christian symbols. By arguing in this way, he is not amending propositional revelation theology; instead, he is outright rejecting it and making use of the fact that revelation does not accomplish anything outside of words. His model of symbol as revelation is a sixth model. It uses a fundamentally different definition of revelation than all the other models and thus is incompatible.

Additionally, Dulles found himself having to constantly safeguard his model from relativism that is inherent in symbolic language. His primary safeguard was grounding symbols in the archetypes of the universe, but this only begs the question of what those archetypes are and who has the authority to decipher what they are. His secondary safeguards are Scripture and Church tradition. However, none of these seem particularly safe places to ground revelation. By removing speech from revelation, it is clear that his theory suffers from an inability to authoritatively communicate truth. At the junction of symbol to human mind there is a gap which he tries to cover up through the interpretive community. Unfortunately, Christianity is not a monolithic community and different communities come up with different understandings of Christian symbols. Who is to say who is right? By displacing Scripture and relying on cosmic archetypes, Dulles places authority firmly in the hands of individual church communities and thus does not escape the relativistic framework he denounces.

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